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Andreas Blume joined the Eller College of Management in 2012. Prior to joining Eller, he taught at the University of Iowa and the University of Pittsburgh. He earned his PhD in Economics from the University of California-San Diego in 1989. His current research focus is on using game theoretic and experimental methods to study strategic communication with imperfectly shared languages, through noisy channels, with costly messages and on organizational coordination in environments with limited or no communication.Show Less
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Courses
- MDMarket Design
- MTMicroeconomic Theory
- GDGames and Decisions
Grants
- Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Should I Trust the Mechanic? An Experiment on Bayesian Persuasion
Principal Investigator (PI)
2018
$6.1K
- Collborative research: Routine Formation in Organizations: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Principal Investigator (PI)
2013
$39.4K
Publications (44)
Recent
- Choosing between communication and control
2021
- Information Processing: Contracts versus Communication
2020
- Failure of Common Knowledge of Language in Common- Interest Communication Games
2018
- Pre-Play communication with forgone costly messages: experimental evidence on forward induction
2016
- Coordination with Decentralized Costly Communication
2016
- Failure of Common Knowledge of Language in Common-Interest Communication Games
2015
- Quid pro Quo: Friendly Information Exchange between Rivals
2015
- Language Games
2014
- Intentional Vagueness
2014
- Organizational coordination with decentralized costly communication
2014
- Dynamic Coordination via Organizational Routines
2014
- Higher-Order Uncertainty About Language
2014
- Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response
2014
- Language Barriers
2013
- Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: An experimental study
2010
- Self-organized criticality in a dynamic game
2010
- Decentralized organizational learning: An experimental investigation
2009
- All equilibria of the multi-unit Vickrey auction
2009
- Chapter 63 The Effect of Message Space Size on Learning and Outcomes in Sender-Receiver Games
2008
- Modeling tacit collusion in auctions
2008
- The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
2007
- Decentralized learning from failure
2007
- Noisy talk
2007
- Private monitoring in auctions
2006
- All equilibria of the Vickrey auction
2004
- A learning-efficiency explanation of structure in language
2004
- Erratum: Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games (Games and Economic Behavior (2004) vol. 46 (240-259) S0899825603001209 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00120-9)
2004
- Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games
2004
- Learning Strategic Sophistication
2004
- Bertrand without fudge
2003
- On the geography of conventions
2003
- Learning and communication in sender-receiver games: An econometric investigation
2002
- Evolution of communication with partial common interest
2001
- Coordination and Learning with a Partial Language
2000
- An Experimental Investigation of Optimal Learning in Coordination Games
2000
- Experimental Evidence on the Evolution of Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games
1998
- Contract renegotiation with time-varying valuations
1998
- Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games
1998
- Neighborhood stability in sender-receiver games
1996
- Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games
1995
- Intraplay Communication in Repeated Games
1994
- Equilibrium Refinements in Sender-Receiver Games
1994
- Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication
1993