Profit maximization is a simple tool that economists use to model firms' behaviors; and this assumption of profit maximization is pervasive in economics. However, it is doubtful that profit maximization is the only way to describe firms? behaviors. In a modern economy, ownership and management are separated for many firms, except for family-owned businesses. Owners are usually shareholders, and they get dividends from their own companies. Managers, such as a CEO and workers, get salaries from companies based on their working performances, indicated as profit and sales, revenue, market shares, or other quantitative indices. For example, suppose a manager?s salary is decided by his sales. Then, he will focus on increasing sales, which leads to a different outcome compared to the case where the manager?s salary is decided based on the firm?s profit. In other words, firms? behaviors depend on how managers? incentives are determined. Managers (delegated by owners) make decisions related to firms? operations, and this does not necessarily result in profit-maximizing behavior. Though there was some research about strategic delegation before, most economic research has assumed profit maximization, without considering strategic delegation. Therefore, this research will examine how firms? behaviors under strategic delegation are different from those obtained under pure profit maximization. This experimental study uses a two-stage Cournot duopoly game to describe strategic delegation in a market (Vickers, 1985; Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Jansen et al., 2007). In the experiment, there are two firms in a market. Each firm consists of one owner and one manager. In Stage 1, both firm owners choose a contract determining the managers? incentives: profit delegation (only profit), revenue delegation (profit and weighted revenue), and market share delegation (profit and weighted market share). In Stage 2, managers choose whether or not to collude. Owners? and managers? selections will determine market output under strategic delegation. Theoretically, the market outcome under strategic delegation is more aggressive than that under profit maximization. Thus, this study will investigate whether the theoretical results are held under strategic delegation. This research will help understand firms? behaviors are more/less competitive than analyzed before. For example, Spierdijk and Zaouras (2017) show that the Lerner index obtained by profit maximization assumption is not appropriate to describe market power if firms do not maximize profit. As an extension of such research, this study will use experiments to identify firms? behaviors that are not profit-maximizing. Also, this project will contribute to improving structural models. Since the BLP model (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995) was proposed, demand estimation has been advanced, but the ?supply? part from the model still assumes profit maximization that leads to underestimating the marginal cost. Thus, the results of the experimental study will potentially help improve structural models. This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.